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 Executive Summary 
 
 
The anticipated removal of remaining legal monopolies in the European postal 
market forces lawmakers and regulators to review the current regulatory framework 
thoroughly. More particularly, competitors of the incumbent will have the ability to 
provide end-to-end service to their customers, thereby opening new business 
opportunities. There is no need for regulation if a competitive postal sector – policed 
with competition law – ensures that public policy objectives are attained. This study 
argues this point while focussing on downstream access; it does not discuss any 
other regulatory measures (universal service, price regulation etc.). 
 
Economics of the postal sector 
There is consensus amongst economists that while some segments of the postal 
sector are characterized by considerable economies of scale, there are generally no 
natural barriers to entry in the form of monopolistic bottlenecks. In other words, 
each and every element of the incumbent’s business can be duplicated.  
 
Furthermore, the presence of multiple mail streams with different service 
requirements means that competitors have a number of potentially successful entry 
strategies to choose from. Entry can begin on a small scale, for instance by targeting 
certain target groups (large mailers), certain regions, etc. Different cost structures of 
new entrants can be expected due to the fact that a large proportion of the mail 
does not require the service levels defined as USO requirements in the past. Entry 
can also start from an existing base, a related business, so as to profit from 
economies of scope and thereby neutralising some of the economies of scale of 
incumbent postal operators. Accordingly, competitors do not have to set up 
collection, transport, sorting or delivery facilities – if at all – at the same scale as the 
incumbents in order to reach profitability quickly. 
 
With the removal of the reserved sector, end-to-end competition becomes possible 
across the board. When faced with the alternative of losing mail flows entirely to 
competitors, incumbents have an incentive to offer services to their competitors in 
order to retain at least part of the revenue lost to them.  
 
Country studies 
An examination of the experience in Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom 
and Sweden confirms the absence of any monopolistic bottleneck in the postal 
sector.  
 
What is more, to the extent that end-to-end competition has been allowed over the 
whole or part of the sector, competitors have been able to launch profitable 
operations even on a small scale, without using the mandatory access system (if 
available) or without requiring one. 
 
Consequences for the regulatory framework 
A number of challenges arise in adapting regulation to an open environment. 
Regulation must move from a technical to an economic approach, where competition 
law becomes a key benchmark.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
1 The report was commissioned by Deutsche Post World Net and TNT. 
  2Under EC competition law, using the conditions set out by the ECJ in Bronner and 
IMS, it appears highly unlikely that the essential facilities doctrine could be used to 
mandate access to the incumbent’s network. To the extent it holds a dominant 
position, however, the incumbent could be subject to a non-discrimination obligation 
in its dealings with third parties. 
 
There must be a strong justification for any regulatory framework to go beyond EC 
competition law. In particular, the “perfect competition trap” must be avoided: the 
shared objective of competition law and regulation is not to have a certain number of 
competitors on the market, but rather to have effective competition with a view to 
increased consumer welfare. Effective competition means value for service; effective 
competition is not incompatible with one operator holding a large share of the 
market, as the contestable market model shows. 
 
In order to assess whether any regulation is necessary, the tests developed by the 
Commission in other sectors are relevant. Regulation can only come into question on 
a relevant market: 
-  with high and persistent barriers to entry; 
-  with no prospect of effective competition over time; 
-  where competition law alone does not suffice to address problems. 
There is no obvious candidate market for regulation in the postal sector at this time. 
In any event, any regulatory remedy would have to respect the general principles of 
adequacy (the remedy addresses the problem) and proportionality. Mos  impor antly, 
lawmakers and regulators must avoid prescribing entry strategies and thus impeding
dynamism and innova ion. If necessary at all, lighter remedies (such as a non-
discrimination obligation, as opposed to access obligations with price control) must 





Policy evaluation and recommendations 
Amongst the countries studied here, the UK is pursuing a somewhat interventionist 
policy in which it can, if requested, impose access terms, with Postcomm preferring 
Royal Mail to develop an access code for access to its delivery network. In Germany 
the incumbent is obliged by law to offer downstream access services which terms 
and conditions are set by the National Regulatory Authority. The Netherlands and 
Sweden, in contrast, leave access issues to be settled via negotiations between 
operators. The performance of these latter markets – in the Dutch case even before 
its complete opening – shows that competitors are able to operate profitably without 
mandated access, and that the market even performs better without such access. 
 
Accordingly, the regulatory framework for an open postal market must be thought 
through carefully. The lack of monopolistic bottlenecks (and thus the possibility of 
bypass) puts the incumbent in such a position that a light regulatory framework – if 
any – is likely to suffice, knowing that competition law will also apply. Possible 
distortion of the market by more interventionist models and the extra costs that are 
generated due to complex regulation make them less attractive. In the end, there is 
every reason to open up the sector with a very light regulatory framework.  
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  41.  Introduction 
 
 
In its most recent progress report to the Council on the application of the Postal 
Directive
2, the European Commission writes: 
 
"Broadly speaking, the postal market has continued to move towards a 
one-way distribution market and away from the more traditional two-way 
communications model. … However, competition has yet to develop in 
the addressed mail segment outside niche services, and this suggests 
that limited initial market opening combined with sometimes limited 
regulatory capacity or certainty, advantages enjoyed by incumbents, and 
regulatory asymmetries have all combined to deter entry". 
 
In its discussion on potential entry barriers, the Commission then elaborates on 
regulatory asymmetries, such as differences in VAT treatment between incumbent 
Universal Service Providers (USPs) and new entrants, the continuing protection of 
incumbents and costumers’ reluctance to change suppliers, however, the 
Commission does not discuss regulatory uncertainty in detail, nor does it reach a 
definite conclusion: 
 
"The reasons for the continuously slow progress towards greater 
competition in fully liberalised postal markets are puzzling and deserve 
further analysis". 
 
In this study, which was performed at the request of Deutsche Post World Net and 
TNT, we provide some elements for such an analysis. Clearly, with the abolition of 
legal barriers to entry (the reserved sector) in postal markets, the possibilities for 
competition increase, and we investigate whether effective competition can develop 
on its own, or whether specific access regulation is necessary or desirable. Our focus 
here is on downstream access, that is, on inserting the mail at a point further down 
the value chain. Our conclusion is that specific access regulation, on top of generic 
non-discrimination principles, is not needed and may be counterproductive as it may 
force entrants into a specific entry mode, thereby possibly limiting innovation.  
 
To put it differently, in this paper, we ask whether, in a liberalised postal market, 
besides legal and regulatory entry barriers, there are natural entry barriers, relating 
to the economics of the postal sector, which could prevent or delay profitable entry. 
We conclude that, as a result of the market moving to a one-way distribution market 
and the absence of monopolistic bottlenecks in the sector, a large section of the 
postal market will be accessible after full liberalisation, hence, there are no natural 
entry barriers. At the same time, regulatory uncertainty about the conditions under 
which access to the USPs delivery network will be available, may make entrants that 
wish to offer end-to-end services reluctant to invest in the rollout of their own 
operations, thus limiting the development of competition. As we argue in this paper, 
the absence of natural entry barriers implies that a hands-off approach, relying on 
                                                 
2 Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the application of the 
Postal Directive (Directive 97/67/EC as amended by Directive 2002/39/EC, Brussels, 23.03.2005, 
COM(2005) 102 final. 
  5negotiated access rather than imposing regulated access, leaving the development of 
competition to the market, is most desirable. 
 
The Postal Directive
3 does not impose specific access rules, although it refers to 
transparent and non-discriminatory access to the postal network, to tariffs and 
special tariffs having to be “geared to cost”, and to the USP having to take into 
account avoided cost when setting special tariffs. In the most recent progress report, 
in its interim conclusions on downstream access, the Commission states that access 
is an important issue that merits further analysis and that it appears premature to 
draw any conclusions at this stage. Elsewhere in that report, it is stated that:  
 
"Access can help facilitate market entry for upstream consolidators. New 
competitors who want to establish a delivery network can also use access 
for a transitional period to build up costumer relationships and volumes, 
before being able to compete end to end with the incumbent". 
 
This no doubt is true, but it is only one side of the picture. If access is cheap as 
compared to rolling out alternative infrastructures, then facilitating access may 
hinder the development of full end-to-end competition, or it may prevent it 
altogether. As infrastructure competition typically offers more scope for innovation 
and provides stronger incentives for cost reduction, facilitating downstream access 
may thus be counterproductive. In this paper we argue that, taking into account EC 
competition law and using the principles underlying the most recent regulatory 
thinking – in particular the EC Electronic Communications Framework – one comes to 
the conclusion that access should not be regulated. Consequently, any access 
regulation would have to be justified by specific and pressing concerns and, since, as 
argued above, regulating access may decrease rather than increase economic 
welfare, certainly in the long run, an economic justification may be hard to find. 
 
Our conclusion differs somewhat from that reached by NERA in its study on the 
economics of postal markets that was conducted on behalf of the Commission.
4 In 
that study it is stated (with emphasis added): 
 
"On the basis of our analysis in the previous section, but provided access 
to delivery networks is granted where necessary, we believe that the 
scope for competition in postal services is substantial". 
 
We agree that the scope for competition is substantial, but in our view, given that 
delivery is not a monopolistic bottleneck, the incumbent will typically find it to be in 
its interest to provide access, especially when a non-discrimination requirement is in 
place. Consequently, obliging the USP to provide access at regulated terms may not 
be necessary. If it were nevertheless found that regulatory intervention could bring 
added value, we believe that the requirements of transparency and non-
discrimination should be sufficient to establish a competitive postal market. 
 
In the remainder of this paper we further substantiate the above argument, 
proceeding along the following lines. First, in Section 2, we discuss general 
theoretical arguments from economics, addressing the question whether there are 
natural barriers to entry. We argue that there is some confusion in the literature 
                                                 
3 Directive 97/67 of 15 December 1997 [1998] OJ L 15/14, as amended by Directive 2002/39 of 10 July 
2002 [2002] OJ L 176/21. 
4 NERA “Economics of Postal Services; A Report to the European Commission DG Markt”, July 2004 
  6about basic concepts, such as natural monopolies, monopolistic bottlenecks and 
entry barriers. We explain the differences and conclude that, on the basis of 
economic theory, there is no justification for regulatory intervention on access as 
there are no monopolistic bottlenecks in the sector, i.e. there are no elements in the 
production chain which are essential to provide the service and which cannot be 
duplicated by competitors. Note that the absence of entry barriers implies that 
potential entry may be a powerful force for disciplining incumbents, hence, even if 
entrants do not have a large market share, this should not be interpreted as the 
market not being effectively competitive. We conclude Section 2 by providing 
indicative calculations to show that profitable entry strategies exist in several market 
segments and that, already with a low market share, entry may be profitable. While 
it may be unlikely that entrants will compete on all market segments, entry is 
scaleable and entrants can access a relatively large portion of the mail market. 
Secondly, from the legal side, in Section 3, we apply the framework of thinking 
associated with the essential facility doctrine and the body of thinking that has 
evolved around the new electronic communications framework. The former specifies 
conditions under which intervention on the basis of the competition law would be 
justified, the latter provides a framework for addressing the question: is ex ante 
intervention desirable? We show that both lead to the conclusion that a hands-off 
approach is most desirable. In Section 4 we look at several European countries, 
specifically Germany, Sweden, The Netherlands and the UK, in more detail. In the 
final Section 5 we draw our conclusions and make several recommendations. 
  72. Conceptual  Issues 
 
 
2.1   Entry Barriers 
 
In a recent NERA report on the postal market that was written on behalf of the 
Commission,
5 the authors write: 
   
“While there is no universally agreed definition of barriers to entry, they 
refer in general to disadvantages (such as higher costs, difficulties 
accessing key inputs, etc) that affect potential entrants but not 
incumbents, and that might prevent entry from occurring in cases where 
incumbent firms are earning excess (that is, super-normal) profits. In 
contrast, cost disadvantages that arise because incumbent firms are 
more efficient than potential entrants are not classed as barriers to entry. 
Barriers to entry may not prevent entry altogether, but may restrict it.”   
 




“Barriers to entry are factors which prevent or impede companies from 
entering a specific market. Entry barriers may result for instance from a 
particular market structure (e.g. sunk cost industry, brand loyalty of 
consumers to existing products) or the behaviour of incumbent firms. It 
is important to add that governments can also be a source of entry 
barriers (e.g. through licensing requirements and other regulations).” 
 
This definition links up with the usual distinction that is made in economics between 
“natural entry barriers”, “strategic entry barriers”, and “legal entry barriers”, where 
the latter category also includes regulatory barriers, such as regulatory uncertainty. 
As the objective of postal market liberalisation is to gradually remove the legal entry 
barriers, we will leave these out of our discussion. Strategic entry barriers, those 
resulting from the possible anti-competitive behaviour of the incumbent USP 
provider, can be tackled by competition policy, and will also not be discussed here. 
Our focus will, hence, be on natural entry barriers, that is, those that arise from the 
structural characteristics of the supply or the demand side of the market. 
 
                                                
Unfortunately, as already hinted at in the NERA report, despite the importance of the 
topic, the economic literature on natural entry barriers is somewhat confusing and 
less developed than would be desirable. First of all, the literature provides a range of 
alternative, non-equivalent definitions.
7 Secondly, an entry barrier might be high or 
 
5 Supra, note 4 
6 European Commission (2003), Glossary of Terms used in Competition related matters, 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/general_info/glossary_en.html#top.  
7 The most well-known are those of Bain (1965) (‘an advantage that incumbent providers in an industry 
have over potential entrants, that allows them to elevate their prices above the level that could be 
expected in a competitive market without inducing potential entrants to enter the industry’) and Stigler 
(1968) ('a cost of producing … which must be borne by a firm which seeks to enter an industry but is 
not borne by firms already in the industry.' ) To the latter requirement, Gilbert (1989)adds that this cost 
advantage must result in excess profits (as opposed to the profit level in a competitive market) for the 
incumbent providers. 
  8low, but the definitions do not make a distinction: an entry barrier might have large 
or small effects. Consequently, the key question for policy, whether an entry barrier 
is so high as to make access regulation desirable, cannot be answered on the basis 
of just the abstract definitions, the more so since these definitions do not look at 
alternatives and at the question what is the best way to do away with the limitations 
on competition that are caused by entry barriers.  
 
Be that as it may, economists agree that sunk costs, costs associated with entry that 
cannot be recovered when the firm exits again, can be an important entry barrier. 
However, as stated in the NERA report that was referred to above, and also in TILEC 
(2003),
8 t h e  m a i n  f e a t u r e s  o f  t h e  p o s t a l  i n d u stry do not impose significant sunk 
costs: sunk costs are negligible for postal operations, which build on computerized 
pre-sorting and manual sequencing. Consequently, in the postal sector, sunk cost 
can be neglected as a potential source of barriers to entry.
9  
 
The picture is different with respect to scale economies, or economies of density, as 
they are called by NERA. We note that the different definitions have different 
implications as to whether scale economies are entry barriers: according to the Bain 
definition, they are, according to Stigler’s definition, they are not. The NERA study 
shows that economies of scale are very important in the postal sector. As they write 
“The evidence from our econometric work is of economies of density. When traffic 
increases on a fixed postal network unit costs fall. In the original 15 Member States 
total costs would increase by 6.5 per cent if traffic on a fixed network were to 
increase by 10 per cent”. Does this cost advantage constitute a barrier to entry? The 
answer is “no”, if an entrant would have a superior technology, then it could make 
an offer to the large senders that would make all these senders better off and that 
would be profitable if it would be accepted by all these senders. In short, scale 
economies do not constitute an entry barrier; at least, scale economies alone do not 
constitute one. It would only be impossible for the entrant to enter if the business 
senders would be somewhat loyal to the incumbent, that is, if there simultaneously 
would be demand side inertia.    
 
We have arrived at the same conclusion as the one that was obtained, more 
generally, in the recent academic literature. In a series of recent papers, in the 
American Economic Review,
10 it has been pointed out that the unsatisfactory nature 
of the existing definitions arises from the fact that these are based on static models. 
As Carlton has written “The failure of the concept of barrier to entry to incorporate a 
time dimension means that it is a concept that is in need of additional embellishment 
in order to be useful in a practical problem or for antitrust or regulatory 
proceedings”. In another one of these papers, McAfee et al conclude that scale 
economies combined with brand loyalty may produce an entry barrier. The intuition 
is as follows. Suppose that the incumbent and entrants can produce according to the 
same cost function with increasing returns to scale. If costumers move to the best 
offer immediately, entry is profitable. If, however, the costumers display brand 
                                                 
8 Paul de Bijl, Eric van Damme and Pierre Larouche “Towards a liberalised postal market”, TILEC, 
Tilburg University, August 2003. 
9 There are more than 1,000 license holders being active in the German market, testifying to the fact 
that there are no sunk cost (RegTP-data as of December 2004). Of course, for full-scale entry, of similar 
size to the USP, one needs to establish sorting centers, and this involves sunk cost. 
10 American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings 2004, with the following contributions: Preston 
McAfee, Hugo Mialon and Michael Williams: “What is a barrier to entry?”, Dennis Carlton: “Why barriers 
to entry are barriers to understanding”, Richard Schmalensee: “Sunk costs and antitrust barriers to 
entry”. 
  9loyalty towards the incumbent, then the entrant can build up market share only 
slowly, and revenues will be lower at the start. This need not be a problem if 
investments are scaleable and can be postponed to match with demand, however, if 
investments are lumpy and have to be incurred at the start of the operations, then it 
may take too long before profits are made. The result may then be that entry can 
become unprofitable.  
 
The question thus is whether, in the postal sector, brand loyalty is so large, and 
investments so lumpy so as to induce an entry barrier in combination with scale 
economies. Direct evidence on this issue is scant, but we believe that experience 
with liberalization in other sectors clearly shows that large costumers quickly switch 
to better offers when these are available. Similarly, the postal sector clearly 
demonstrates that entry is scaleable. Consequently, in our opinion, scale economies 
do not either contribute to entry barriers. More precisely, in order to assess whether 
it is justified to compel network access, it is important to determine whether, in the 
postal sector, there are insurmountable entry barriers that interfere with normal 
market mechanisms, in particular the development of effective competition. In our 
view, such insurmoun able entry barriers t , that would justify regulating access to  he 
USPs networks, do no exist. 
t
t 
                                                
 
 
2.2 Natural  Monopoly 
 
It is frequently stated that the postal market is a natural monopoly.
11 Although this 
statement may be true, it is misleading and hardly relevant, as we describe in this 
section. While the term “natural monopoly” is suggestive, the concept is associated 
with various misunderstandings. It is sometimes stated that:  
(i)  an industry that is a natural monopoly is best served if there is only one 
supplier;  
(ii)  in an industry that is a natural monopoly, competition is not possible 
(viable), hence, such an industry will naturally be a monopoly. 
As we will show here, both statements are wrong in general. Before showing that, 
we provide an exact definition of the term and illustrate the limitations inherent in 
the concept. 
 
For simplicity, consider a single product industry and let C(.) be the cost function of a 
(typical) firm in the industry. The industry is said to be a natural monopoly at output 
level Q if Q can be produced cheaply if there is just one firm in the industry, in other 
words, if the cost function is sub-additive at Q: 
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11 For a dissenting view, see Sean Ennis: “When is Postal Delivery a Natural Monopoly?”, paper 
presented at the 13
th Conference on Postal and Delivery Economics, Antwerp, June 1-4, 2005. 
  10The industry is said to be a natural monopoly if it is a natural monopoly at all 
possible output levels Q. We note that if unit cost are falling throughout, hence: 
 
 
   is decreasing in Q,  Q Q C / ) (
 
then the industry is a natural monopoly. In other words, if there are increasing 
returns to scale, then the industry is a natural monopoly. 
 
One may immediately note the important implicit assumption underlying the concept 
that all firms are supposed to operate according to the same cost function. Now 
consider the first statement that an industry with such a cost function is best served 
by one firm. If the industry would be a monopoly, the single provider would, 
presumably, have market power. This would naturally lead to a higher mark-up, 
hence, a price that lies above marginal and average cost. If the monopolist is 
successful in raising price, then price may be higher that the price that would result 
under competition, even though in the latter case, the cost would be higher. In other 
words, lower cost need not translate into a lower price. Secondly, if the monopolist is 
shielded from competition, he need not have an incentive (or not an as strong 
incentive) to reduce costs. In other words, competition may lead to cost reductions 
that may not be available (or may not be as easily available) in the case of 
monopoly. To put it in yet different words, taking a dynamic perspective, competition 
may be preferable. 
 
We wish to note here that regulation may limit the exercise of market power by the 
monopolist, hence, regulation may improve allocative efficiency, while maintaining 
(static) cost efficiency. In general, regulation will not be perfect, however. Even more 
importantly, regulation will probably not be as effective as competition in reducing 
cost. 
 
Let us now turn to the second statement, that competition is not viable in industries 
that are natural monopolies. This statement is true if competition would take the 
form of price competition, à la Bertrand. This is the most intensive form of 
competition that can be imagined: it assumes that providers do not differentiate their 
products, that consumers are fully aware of the prices and that they switch to a 
cheaper provider no matter how small the discount that this provider offers as 
compared to the incumbent supplier. For other forms of competition that are less 
intense than Bertrand competition, entry is possible and can be profitable in markets 
that are natural monopolies. An example is provided by quantity competition à la 
Cournot. In this case, competition is less intense, the price cost margin is positive 
and entrants can profitable enter in monopolistic industries. To conclude, in 
industries that are natural monopolies, competition may be feasible and competition
may be preferable to monopolistic supply. 
 
 
  112.3 Monopolistic  Bottlenecks 
 
A natural monopoly does not in itself necessarily present an insurmountable entry 
barrier. This is the most important insight that comes out of the 'contestability' 
literature (Baumol and Willig 1981).
12 If a company does not have to sink costs in 
order to enter the market, the threat of competition will impose discipline the 
incumbent: even if it has a high market share, the party will refrain from demanding 
non-competitive prices because of the risk of being undercut by a potential entrant.  
 
In some industries, the network, or a certain segment of it, is of such a nature that, 
in order to be able to provide services to the costumers, access to this network is 
essential, and the network or the component involved cannot be reproduced. 
Examples would be the railways or the electricity industry, cases in which it would 
not be economically feasible to reproduce the physical network. Both of these cases 
involve a monopolistic bottleneck that a company must pass through if it wants to 
provide the respective services. In cases like these, an entrant must incur substantial 
sunk costs to enter the market, which may be prohibitive, and even if they are not, 
this provides a protective wall behind which the incumbent can hide.  
 
The important distinction is, therefore, whether entering the market requires specific 
sunk investments. The relevant question is not whether the industry is a natural 
monopoly, but rather whether there is a monopolistic bottleneck. A company that 
owns a bottleneck facility (in legal language also called an essential facility) could be 
inclined to refuse competitors access to the facility in order to monopolise the 
market, and in such case ex ante regulation might be called for. As we argued 
above, in our view, there are no essential facilities in the postal sector. 
 
Indeed, entrants are not faced with insurmountable entry barriers. It is possible to 
enter certain (product or geographical) segments of the market while incurring only 
low sunk costs and still attain a stable market position. From there, the entrant can 
eventually grow further (and still with only moderate sunk costs) and find a stable 
market position once it has reached a larger size, and so forth. In short, there is 
room for various entry and growth strategies, and as a consequence, one does not 
have to bring in a detailed set of regulations to help entrants get over a high entry 
barrier and, at the same time, drastically restrict the entrant's strategic choices or, at 
the very least, drastically curb the incentives to innovate. The absence of sunk costs 
allows entrants considerable flexibility in their organisation; this guarantees a high 
measure of allocative efficiency over time and promotes innovation. The legal and 
regulatory framework should, therefore, be geared towards preventing a situation 
where various providers are tied to a fixed business structu e.    r
                                                
 
Without eliminating the possibility that only one provider will emerge to offer all 
services to all potential customers, it can be said with certainty that there are 
segments of the postal market that a newcomer can enter and turn a profit. This 
means that one should not only focus on full market entry, but especially pay 
attention to the segments of the market.  
 
 
12 William Baumol and Robert Willig: “Fixed costs, sunk costs, entry barriers and the sustainability of 
monopoly”, Quarterly Journal of Economics (August 1981), 405- 431 
  122.4  Drawbacks of Access Regulation 
 
Given the absence of monopolistic bottlenecks, the postal market allows for a variety 
of entry strategies. Entrants can, for instance, be categorized according to the entry 
mode (e.g. based on access or by investing in its own facilities) and targeted market 
segments (geographical and customer type). From telecommunications markets we 
know that regulation strongly affects the incentives on whether and how to enter the 
market (or a segment thereof). Moreover, entry decisions also depend on the 
expected future regulatory policy.  
 
Given the heterogeneity among entrants, given the presence of universal service 
considerations and the great importance of the sector also as a source of 
employment, political motives and constraints may pose substantial problems while 
designing sound regulation. As certain entry modes depend, for their viability, on the 
regulatory framework, there is a ‘demand’ for certain regulatory interventions. The 
question is, however, whether regulators should try to aim at certain types of 
competition, or let the market determine what works best. Also, since the nature of 
universal service obligations affects entry and the resulting market structure, an 
assessment of the justification of universal service goals and means (based on a 
cost-benefit analysis) is called for. 
 
It is important to note that entrants face regulatory uncertainty when deciding 
whether or not to invest. For instance, they may act more cautiously, to wait and see 
which regulation will apply in the liberalized segments. This results in a delay of entry 
and investments, slowing down the maturing of competition: entrants choose a 
smaller coverage, or invest less in their own facilities, than without regulatory 
uncertainty. For instance, some segments mature faster than others, and entrants 
may plan to target some segments earlier than others. If investments are delayed in 
a particular segment, entry can also be delayed in other segments, in particular if 
entrants become active in a stepwise manner: entering the next segment only if 
entry in the previous one was successful. Hence, as a result of regulatory 
uncertainty, overall entry will be delayed and the strong position of incumbents will 
be maintained longer than necessary, increasing the need for heavy-handed 
regulation. Also, regulatory uncertainty creates a bias towards entry modes based on 
access, and away from investments in their own facilities. In this respect, it would be 
best to settle the access issue once and for all. 
 
In order to make access operational, both the incumbent and the entrant have to 
adapt their internal organization and processes. The incumbent has to create ‘space’ 
for the incoming mail volumes, both physically and with respect to capacity and 
planning. The entrant has to set up its processes such that they are in line with the 
incumbent's requirements for incoming mail volumes. The investments that the firms 
have to do to make this possible, are specific for this activity only. This creates a 
mutual dependency among the firms. In the case of unforeseen events, such as an 
‘external event’ causing a hiccup in the incumbent’s sorting/delivery system or a 
failure by the entrant to deliver the agreed volume, the firms (or at least one of the 
involved parties) will try to renegotiate the charges and conditions of the access 
agreement. Given that their interests are not aligned, this will not be easy and will 
involve substantial transaction costs, for instance because the regulator, or perhaps a 
court, will have to intervene. Also, given that contracts will always be incomplete, 
  13one can expect that these types of problems will arise sooner or later.
13 An entrant 
that does not rely on access but invests in its own facilities will be facing a higher 
investment ‘hurdle’, but it benefits by not having to make asset-specific investments 
of the type needed in the case of access-based entry. Consequently, such an entrant 
will not be subject to a ‘hold-up’ problem and costly problems of renegotiation will be 
avoided when entrants do not rely on access. As the literature shows, in the case of 
complementary assets, investment and innovation is spurred by vertical integration, 
hence, stimulating end-to-end competition may yield dynamic benefits. Policy makers 
would be well advised to take the costs and inefficiencies caused by incomplete 
contracts and renegotiations into account when designing regulatory interventions.  
 
It seems to us that, up to now, the two issues discussed in this subsection, 
regulatory uncertainty and incomplete contracting, might not yet have received the 
attention they deserve, and that due consideration of these issues may well reverse 
the preference from access based competition to end-to-end competition. In any 




2.5   Economies of Scale and Entry Strategies  
 
Given scale economies in delivery, new entrants to postal markets need to have 
efficiency advantages, or other cost advantages, in order to compete successfully 
with incumbents. After all, if they would have the same cost function, then with a 
smaller market share, they would automatically have higher unit cost. The natural 
question now is how large a market share a “reasonably efficient” entrant needs to 
obtain in order to reach cost parity with the incumbent. Obviously, the answer to this 
question will depend on the precise details of the market under consideration, on the 
cost structure and the efficiency of the incumbent, on the wage premiums that it 
pays, etc. Consequently, providing an answer is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Nevertheless, in this section, we provide a perspective by briefly discussing some 
papers that have addressed this question. We believe this discussion to be warranted 
as these papers have come up with widely varying estimates of the critical market 
share. Clearly then, more research on this topic would be welcome. 
 
It is obvious that entrants will not choose to mimic the business models and 
networks of incumbents. These originate from a time when the postal market was 
very different and they have been designed to fulfil the universal service obligation 
that is imposed on the incumbent. Entrants do not face such restrictions, and they 
will take advantage of the current situation. The postal market has moved away from 
a traditional two-way communications market, with businesses now being 
responsible for 80 to 90% of the mail that is offered. Single item residential mail is 
only a small segment of the market and as handling of it is costly, this segment is 
less attractive to entrants. Entrants will predominantly focus on the B2B and B2C 
segments, both on high value mail as well as on bulk mail. Here we restrict ourselves 
to the latter. Entrants’ ability to compete in that segment is enhanced by the fact 
that the market is relatively concentrated on the sender side. In the Netherlands, for 
example, 50% of the mail originates from 500 to 600 large senders.
14 In addition 
                                                 
13 For an overview, see Hart, O. (1995), Firms, Contracts and Financial Structure, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
14 IG&H Management Consultants (2003) “Marktontwikkelingen en praktijkcases tonen toegankelijkheid 
van de Nederlandse postmarkt aan”, Woerden, June 2003. 
  14such mail can be pre-sorted electronically, hence, the entrant just has to focus on 
sequence sorting and actual delivery. As long as the entrant serves a limited number 
of customers, the first task can easily be done manually, which implies the absence 
of costly investments. Consequently, entrants can keep things simple and cheap by 
targeting a few large senders that generate sufficient volume. Indeed, several 
successful entrants in European postal markets, such as CityMail in Sweden and 
Sandd and Selektmail in the Netherlands, seem to adopt models of this type. 
 
Taking such a model as our basis, the question is what volume an entrant needs in 
order to reach cost parity with the incumbent in delivery. As described above, the 
entrant has a less complex mail flow, hence, it will incur lower sequence sorting costs 
than a (traditional) incumbent that manually sequences the mail. Consequently, we 
may focus on actual delivery. Obviously, given economies of scale, the entrant would 
like to limit the frequency of delivery as well as to restrict operations as much as 
possible to low cost, high density areas. In areas where the entrant’s volume is thin, 
it will prefer to hand the mail to the incumbent for delivery. If the entrant’s unit cost 
is lower than the incumbent’s price, the entrant will choose to deliver itself. 
 
Cohen and Chu
15 were the first to calculate what market share a competitor would 
need to capture in order to have the same unit cost as the US Postal Service. Their 
calculation is based on a cost function that is estimated on detailed data from the US 
Postal Services. The cost function distinguishes between route time (a fixed cost 
representing the time it takes to complete the route), access time (the time it takes 
to visit an address along the route to make an actual delivery) and load time (the 
time it takes to place the mail in a mail receptacle); the first component is fixed, the 
second partly fixed and partly variable, and the third is 100 percent variable with 
volume. Cohen and Chu conclude that it is very difficult to enter the US market: an 
entrant that has a cost advantage of 50% and that delivers only one day a week 
would still need 15% market share in order to reach cost parity with the US Postal 
Service. An entrant that delivers two days a week would need 19% market share if it 
had a 50% cost advantage, and 23% if it had a 33% cost advantage. Clearly in the 
US, the critical market share is high. 
 
A similar conclusion seems to be drawn by Postcomm for the UK. In Annex 1 to the 
Competitive Market Review,
16 Postcomm reports results from a model that has been 
developed by Royal Mail. The conclusion drawn is that significant volume may be 
required to compete profitably head to head with Royal Mail: “to match Royal Mail’s 
present unit cost for delivery six days per week, and depending on the assumptions 
about new entrant’s costs compared to Royal Mail, a new entrant might need to 
capture around 50% market share”. As Chart A1.1 in that Annex shows, an entrant 
that delivers only one day per week, would still need about 30% market share to 
reach cost parity, a surprisingly high number. 
 
In contrast, several studies have come up with low critical market shares for the 
Netherlands. Using the methodology from Cohen and Chu (1997), SEO (2003) 
concludes that an entrant to the Dutch market would only need 10% of the volume 
                                                 
15 Robert Cohen and Eward Chu (1997) “A measure of scale economies for postal systems”, in Michael 
Crew and Paul Kleindorfer “Managing change in the postal delivery industries”, Kluwer Academic 
Publishers. 
16 Postcomm “Competitive Market Review”, September 2004. 
  15to be able to compete with TNT on the basis of six days delivery.
17  Even more 
relevant, that study concludes that an entrant that chooses to deliver 2 days per 
week only need 3% of the volume. An appendix to SEO (2003) contains a separate 
analysis by the economic consultancy firm Nolan, Norton & Co. This analysis also 
makes use of the Cohen and Chu (1997) methodology, but it complements it with 
data obtained from market parties. In addition, it discusses several alternative entry 
strategies. 
 
The first alternative is entry by a greenfield operator, which has labour costs that are 
60% of those of TNT. The conclusion is that, if delivery is limited to 2 days per week, 
4% market share suffices to reach cost parity with TNT.
18 Furthermore, the entrant 
would be very profitable if it would attract its business with a 10% discount as 
compared to the prices charged by TNT. A second scenario considers the case where 
the entrant already operates on related markets and hence can profit from 
economies of scope. In this case, entry (at existing prices minus 10%) would be 
profitable already with 1% market share, while cost partly would be obtained with 
2% market share. 
 
The conclusion is that the various estimates for the critical market share vary widely. 
This no doubt is partly due to the differences in the countries that are considered, 
the different methodologies that are employed, and the quality of the data. Given 
this variability, it is important to complement these analyses on the basis of models 
with actual experiences. In the Netherlands, two entrants, Sandd and SelektMail, 
each had about 2,5% of the market in 2004 and each of them claims to make a 
profit. In Germany, PIN-AG is an entrant that focuses mainly on the Berlin area. It 
started operations in 1999 and claims to have reached profitability in 2003. 
Meanwhile, it has achieved around 20% of the local Berlin market. In Sweden, City 
Mail has been active since 1991, focusing mainly on delivery of pre-sorted bulk mail 
in urban areas. Jonsson and Selander (2005)
19 report that CityMail has 7,5% of the 
overall market and that it has 25% of the market segment in which it is active. Also 
this company appears to run a profitable business. Apparently, entrants in several 
countries can  compete successfully even with relatively low market shares.  









17 SEO (2003). Tante Pos krijgt concurrentie; effecten van de liberalisering van de postmarkt, SEO, 
Amsterdam, September 2003 at p. 29 
18 A similar calculation is reported in TILEC: “Towards a liberalised postal market”, Tilburg University, 
August 2003, but there the critical number is 14%. 
19 Per Jonsson and Sten Selander: “The “real” graveyard spiral; experiences from the liberalized Swedish 
postal market”. Paper presented at the 13th Conference on Postal and Delivery Economics, Antwerp, 
Belgium, June 1-4, 2005. 
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3.  Consequences for the Regulatory Framework 
 
 
3.1  Challenges for Regulation 
                                                
 
The anticipated opening of the postal sector not only entails a revised economic 
analysis, but it also confronts regulation with a number of challenges. 
 
As long as there is a reserved sector (as is the case now), postal regulation will 
follow a relatively predictable path. It will deal with: 
 
- the delineation of the reserved sector;
20 
- the management of the reserved sector, i.e. the type of services to be 
offered,
21 the price thereof,
22 accounting systems,
23 etc.; 
- the interface between the reserved and the non-reserved sector.
24 
 
The reserved sector plays a central role. Since it is under legal monopoly, it needs to 
be policed by regulation. Furthermore, the presence of a legal monopoly distorts the 
normal functioning of the market, so that there is less room for full-fledged economic 
analysis as a basis for sound regulation. Regulation can remain very prescriptive and 
technical. 
 
In a liberalized environment, however, the reserved sector vanishes, and with it the 
need for detailed regulation to delineate and manage it. The whole postal sector is 
then open to the workings of the market economy. It is then imperative for 
regulation to rest on solid economic analysis in order not to cancel the benefits of the 
operation of the market. Overly technical regulation must be discarded in favour of 
regulation based on economics. Under these circumstances, detailed prescriptions at 
the legislative level are likely to make room for more general legislation articulated 
around economic analysis. Against that background, competition law – which is 
formulated in general terms and implemented by a competition authority – appears 
as a model. At the same time, it is also a benchmark: economic regulation which 
follows the footsteps of competition law in substance is likely to be justifiable, 
whereas regulation exceeding the bounds of competition law should require a 
specific justification. 
 
More than anything else, the opening up of the postal sector means that the 
lawmakers and regulatory authorities must go back to the drawing board and rethink 
regulation thoroughly. Of course, the experience made in other comparable sectors – 
especially electronic communications – is highly relevant: there is no need to re-
invent the wheel. However, that experience must be used correctly. Simply 
transposing the end-result of the regulatory process from one sector to the other is 
neither convincing nor responsible from an academic perspective. Rather, the main 
lesson to be drawn from the new framework in electronic communications lies in the 
 
20 Directive 97/67, Art. 7-8. 
21 Directive 97/67 only provides for the universal service, Art. 3-6, and does not specify any other 
services to be offered within the reserved sector. 
22 Here as well, Directive 97/67 only does so for the universal service, Art. 12-13. 
23 Ibid., Art. 14. 
24 Ibid., Art. 11 (this provision has not been used so far) and 12, 5
th indent (by extension). 
  17significance of a principled approach to regulation, which starts from the 
fundamentals. A lot of progress has been made on how to assess whether regulation 
is necessary, how to analyse markets, how to choose the appropriate remedy, etc. 
Therein lies the biggest contribution of other industries to the discussion in the postal 
sector.  
 
Indeed the specific characteristics of the postal sector, as outlined above, present 
regulation with a further challenge. In sectors such as energy or fixed 
communications, the number of possible entry strategies is limited, and given the 
considerable sunk costs involved, it is legitimate for regulation to be designed in such 
a way as favour a given entry model (if a choice needs to be made). Even then, this 
is risky, since regulators may find it hard to withdraw access regulation later on, or 
commit to sunset clauses. Moreover, regulators and policy makers often fail to 
“foresee” what types of competition will or can develop. Hence, even in the presence 
of significant sunk costs, as in energy or fixed telecommunications, regulators should 
make utmost care to make sure that they do not distort entrants’ choices for 
different entry strategies. 
 
Because of its different cost structure (no or less sunk costs), the above reasoning is 
even more important in post. In the postal sector, a number of different entry 
strategies are possible in an open postal market. In the absence of any overriding 
reason, regulation should hence avoid prescribing how competitors are to enter  he 
market by pushing them towards one strategy more than the other. The need to 
refrain from pre-determining market outcomes becomes all the more urgent when a 
dynamic perspective is added. The availability of different entry strategies translates 
into uncertainty as to market developments over time. The operation of market 
forces then gains extra significance, since it is a prime vehicle to allow 
experimentation between those strategies with a view to improving consumer 
welfare. From a dynamic perspective, there are many reasons to preserve the full 
range of entry strategies: 
t
 
- No one, including the regulatory authority, is able to predict which entry 
strategy will be successful, i.e. that it will meet demand requirements, either 
as regards price or non-price parameters, and improve consumer welfare. 
Given that unpredictability, it is preferable to allow market dynamics to do 
their work, offering customers innovative services and leaving customers to 
pick the winning strategies; 
- Exposing the incumbent to a variety of entry strategies by its competitors 
forces it to remain itself nimble and innovative, and reduces the risk that the 
incumbent could fend off competition with a simple counter-strategy; 
- Newcomers to the market compete also via their entry strategies. Depriving 
them of such an important competitive parameter could significantly dull their 
incentive to innovate in seeking the strategy which is best for each of them, 
turning the newcomers into clones of each other. 
 
 
  183.2  Main Elements to be Expected in the Regulatory Framework 
 
The regulatory framework for an open postal sector is likely to deal with the 
following issues: 
 
- access to the market, the objective being to make it as easy as possible; 
- relationships between market players; 
- relationships with consumers, the main issues here being the provision of 
universal service, protection of consumers against market power and other 
forms of consumer protection (information, etc.); 
- procedural and institutional matters. 
 




- the promotion of competition; 
- the development of the internal market; and 
- the promotion of the interests of citizens (including universal service). 
 
In comparison with the current framework, the objectives would be better outlined 
and hence their interaction easier to articulate. Now, the concept of “reserved 
sector” plays a central role, but it aims both at ensuring the provision of universal 
service and at delineating the room for competition and the internal market to be 
realized. This cannot but create confusion. In an open sector with these three 
objectives, on the other hand, it is logical to begin by re-thinking regulation in order 
to achieve the first two objectives (competition, internal market), and then to move 
on to universal service. The discussion of universal service starts with (i) a 
determination of what should be included therein (scope of universal service), 
followed by (ii) an assessment of whether the market delivers that universal service 
and (iii) if not, how its provision could be regulated (assignment of obligation, 
monitoring, financing) is such a way as to achieve universal service without 
compromising the other objectives.
26 Indeed if markets work and deliver universal 
service, then the need for regulatory intervention to ensure the provision of universal 
service is alleviated. 
 
The recent proposals made by Postcomm for the regulation of Royal Mail (RM) after 
liberalization,
27 for instance, seem to approach the issue backwards. Postcomm takes 
as a starting point the need to allow the USP, RM, to have sufficient revenues to 
finance its universal service obligation, and then it proceeds to design a regulatory 
scheme which allows as much competition as possible, in Postcomm’s view. This 
means that Postcomm’s regulatory proposals aim not only to open markets, but also 
to provide a measure of protection for RM, typically by ensuring that RM receives a 
sufficient volume of mail to sustain its operations under a universal service 
constraint.
28 This latter aim is achieved by extending regulation further into the 
access products which RM offers to its competitors and large customers, introducing 
                                                 
25 Directive 2002/21 of 7 March 2002 (Framework Directive) [2002] OJ L 108/33, Art. 8(2) to 8(4). 
26 See the approach followed in Directive 2002/22 of 7 March 2002 (Universal Service Directive) [2002] 
OJ L 108/51, Art. 3-15. 
27 Postcomm, 2006 Royal Mail Price and Service Quality Review – Initial Proposals (1 June 2005), 
available on Postcomm’s website (visited on 7 June 2005). 
28 Indeed it is one of Postcomm’s duties to ensure that RM has sufficient revenues to finance its 
universal service obligations: see ibid., para. S.26, S.33, 4.33.  
  19a retail-minus price control regime over a basket of access offerings. This in turn 
encourages competitors to make use of RM’s delivery facilities instead of rolling out 
their infrastructure, even when that would be more efficient. In the end, the aim of 
ensuring the financing of RM’s obligations can conflict with the aim of opening 
markets to competition, leading to flawed regulation. It would have been preferrable 
first to assess which regulatory framework would be necessary to ensure that open 
markets function effectively (as we argue in this paper, a light framework, if any, is 
sufficient), and only thereafter to ascertain whether universal service obligations can 
be discharged within such an environment. 
 
The focus of the present research is on relationships between market players, and 
accordingly other parts of the regulatory framework will not be dealt with further. 
 
 




                                                
As was mentioned above, in an open postal sector, regulation is likely to be modelled 
on competition law. It is accordingly necessary first to examine what the situation 
would be under competition law in order to have a framework of reference for 
regulatory developments. We will look first at market definition, then market analysis 
and finally at the consequences under competition law of these findings. 
 
 
3.3.1 Market  Definition
 
As for market definition, there is no clear picture emerging yet from EC competition 
law. The decision practice at the retail level is starting to show some consistency, 
and much like in the telecommunications and air transport sectors, the Commission is 
breaking down the sector along certain characteristics and then combining these 
characteristics to define what are often relatively narrow markets. For instance, in 
Deutsche Post/DHL, a first-phase merger control decision, the Commission split the 
sector using the following characteristics:
29 
 
-  mail and parcel delivery on the one hand, and freight on the other hand, 
-  express and deferred services; 
-  domestic and international services; 
- business and private customers. 
 
This led the Commission to define markets such as “international express delivery”, 
“international express freight” and “international business mail”. It must be 
underlined, however, that ultimately market definition did not matter in that decision 
– even on the narrowest market definition there was no concern – so that it is still 
very much conceivable that the Commission would define markets differently in a 
case where the market definition mattered for the outcome. 
 
Market definition at the level of services provided between competitors, in 
comparison, has not been developed that far: 
 
29 Decision of 21 October 2002, Deutsche Post/DHL, available on the DG COMP website (visited 20 May 
2005), para. 10-18. 
  20- Until now, the presence of legal monopolies influences market definition: that 
part of the postal service chain which is still under monopoly tends to be put 
in a relevant market and the rest on a second, separate market. Hence the 
Commission has tended to find a first market ranging from collection to the 
point in the service chain at the border between the reserved and open 
sectors, and a second market from that point onwards to delivery to the 
customer.
30  
- It is too early to predict whether this approach – defining only two markets – 
will be continued in the context of an open postal sector, given that the 
Commission has a general tendency to define relevant markets narrowly. 
 
In the end, it is probably safe to assume that there will be some relevant market for 
“downstream” services, but it cannot be forecast at which point in the postal service 
chain this market will start. 
 
 
3.3.2 Market  Assessment 
 
In the absence of a clear view as to how market definition could turn out, it is 
difficult to predict the outcome at the market analysis stage (including the 
assessment of dominance). Indeed, given the findings made in part 2.3. about the 
lack of monopolistic bottlenecks, a good argument can be made that any large 
market position which could lead to a finding of market power – determined on the 
basis of historic market shares, size and resources of the firm, economies of scale, 
etc. – is vulnerable to entry and can quickly shrink.
31 In that case, in the absence of 
a significant barrier to entry, potential competition would hold any market power in 
check and there would be no dominance.  
 
For the remainder, it will be assumed for the sake of argument that the Commission, 
another competition authority or a court would nevertheless find that the incumbent 
postal operator holds a dominant position on a downstream market. The interesting 
issue is what consequences this would bring for the incumbent postal operator, i.e. 
which obligations would that imply. In other words, which type of behaviour could 
possibly constitute abuse according to the case-law, so that the incumbent should in 
practice avoid engaging in it? 
 




                                                 
30 Two recent cases illustrate that point. In the recent BdKEP decision (Decision of 20 October 2004, 
available on the DG COMP website (visited 20 May 2005), para. 45-51.), dealing with domestic mail, the 
Commission found an upstream and a downstream markets. As regards cross-border mail, the 
Commission in REIMS II renotification (Decision 2004/139 of 23 October 2003 [2004] OJ L 56/76, para. 
70-77.) distinguished between “outgoing cross-border mail” and “incoming cross-border mail”. 
31 For a recent, accurate and authoritative summary, see the Commission Guidelines on market analysis 
and the assessment of significant market power under the Community regulatory framework for 
electronic communications networks and services [2002] OJ C 165/6 at para. 75-80. 
  213.3.3 Access  to Facilities 
                                                
 
Forcing firms to give access to their facilities to third parties (in the absence of 
previous dealings) brings competition law to its edge. It puts competition law on a 
collision course with another central value in the legal system, namely the protection 
of ownership (whether it concerns physical or intellectual property). The owner of 
property must be entitled to use and dispose of it. In an investment context, in 
particular, this principle gains a further dimension: the investor commits large sums 
of money to creating intellectual property or deploying facilities, and it should be 
entitled to make a return on that investment. This tension between competition law 
and property rights explains why the US Supreme Court
32 and the ECJ
33 have 
traditionally been very reluctant to allow competition law to be used to open up 
access to facilities which were heretofore closed to third parties.
34 
 
This is sometimes brought under the keyword “essential facilities”, but what matters 
is the test put forward in the case-law of the ECJ. In the case of physical facilities, 
the current test results from combining Bronner with IMS.
35 This test applies in order 
to judge whether a firm should be ordered to open up a facility (seen as a separate 
relevant market) in order to enable a competitor to compete with the firm on a 
secondary market. Before competition law can be invoked to force the opening of 
production facilities, four conditions must all be met: 
 
a)  the facility is indispensable to operate on the secondary market, i.e. it cannot 
be duplicated; 
b)  the refusal to give access to the facility is unjustified; 
c)  the refusal to give access prevents the emergence of a new product for which 
there is customer demand; 
d)  the refusal to give access is likely to exclude competition on the secondary 
market. 
 
These four conditions will be reviewed in turn. 
 
Indispensability of the facility 
This condition was discussed at length in Bronner. That case is especially interesting 
since it is not only relevant as a legal precedent, but also on its facts. In Bronner, a 
small newspaper publisher in Austria (Bronner) wanted access (against reasonable 
remuneration) to the nationwide home delivery system of the largest newspaper 
publisher (Mediaprint), arguing that its own delivery method (using the Austrian 
post) was not competitive, and that it could not on its own (given its small 





32 See Verizon Communications v. Trinko, Docket 02-262 (13 January 2004).
33 See the two most recent precedents (on which the discussion is based): ECJ, 26 November 1998, 
Case C-7/97, B onner [1998] ECR I-7791 and ECJ, 29 April 2004, Case C-418/01, IMS Health, not yet 
reported. 
34 The Commission has traditionally been less reluctant than the ECJ to use competition law to open 
access to facilities. However, the ECJ has the last word. It will be interesting to see how the CFI (and 
perhaps eventually the ECJ) will assess the Commission’s Decision of 24 March 2004, Microsoft, 
available on DG COMP’s website, now before the CFI. 
35 The indispensability condition is not dealt with as a separate condition in IMS, since the case deals 
with intellectual property, which is by definition not duplicable (or only within narrow limits in the case 
of copyright) and thus indispensable. It is covered at length in B onner, which deals with physical 
property. For the rest, the tests put forward in the two cases are similar, with IMS precising that the 
conditions are cumulative. 
  22whether Mediaprint’s refusal to grant Bronner access constituted an abuse of 
dominant position within the meaning of Article 82 EC. The ECJ started by recalling 
that the first step is market definition: there might be existing substitutes to 
Mediaprint’s system, thus making the relevant market larger and possibly leading to 
the conclusion that Mediaprint is not dominant.
36 Next, on the issue of 
indispensability, the ECJ adds that even if the relevant market were made up by 
Mediaprint’s system alone, that does not suffice to make Mediaprint’s nationwide 
system indispensable.
37 The ECJ notes that (i) there are other methods of delivery 
available (post, etc.) even if they are less advantageous
38 and (ii) competitors of 
Mediaprint can always, alone or in cooperation, set up a rival nationwide newspaper 
delivery system.
39 Very importantly, the ECJ adds that 
 
“it is not enough to argue that [creating a rival system] is not 
economically viable by reason of the small circulation of the daily 
newspaper or newspapers to be distributed… [I]t would be necessary 
at the very least to establish…that it is not economically viable to 
create a second [system] with a circulation comparable to that of… 
the existing scheme. ” 
 
In the case of the postal sector, it is generally agreed that there are no monopolistic 
bottlenecks in the delivery chain. In other words, competitors can create a rival 
delivery system and bypass that of the incumbent, and some of them are already 
doing so. In line with Bronner, the fact that the competing systems are not or would 
not be identical to the incumbent’s – whether in terms of coverage or frequency – 
does not turn the incumbent’s delivery system into an essential facility. Finally, on 
the basis of Bronner, a competitor would have to show that, even with a volume of 
business comparable to the incumbent, it would not be “economically viable” to put 
together a competing postal delivery system. As was seen before in part 2.4, even 
with a volume of business substantially smaller than the incumbent’s, competitors 
can already enter the market profitably on the basis of their own facilities. 
Accordingly, on the basis of the test in Bronner, the postal service chain would not 
comprise indispensable facilities. 
 
Justification for the refusal 
There is no specific information concerning this condition. 
 
New product  
                                                
In IMS Health, this condition was elaborated upon by the ECJ. In order to obtain 
access under competition law, the competitor must show that it “does not intend to 
limit itself essentially to duplicating the goods or services already offered on the 
secondary market by the [incumbent], but intends to produce new goods or services 
not offered by the [incumbent] and for which there is a potential consumer 
demand”.
40 According to IMS Health, competitors cannot override the incumbent’s 
property rights just to produce cheaper clones of the incumbent’s services, they must 
indicate that they meet pent-up demand for innovative services. 
 
 
36 Bronner, supra, note 33, para. 34. 
37 Ibid., para. 42. 
38 Ibid., para. 43. 
39 Ibid., para. 44. 
40  IMS Health,  supra, note 33, para. 49, replacing “owner of the intellectual property right” with 
“incumbent” to match the situation in a case of access to physical property. 





                                                
This touches upon a central point. In sectors such as electronic communications or 
energy, entrants have a limited number of entry strategies, sometimes only one. In 
some cases, these strategies require access to the incumbent’s facilities. In the 
postal sector, it was seen before in part 2 that entry on the postal market is scalable 
while there are no sunk costs, i.e. that there are many entry strategies which can 
succeed. Given the absence of monopolistic bottlenecks, these entry strategies do 
not depend on mandated or regulated access to the incumbent’s infrastructure. 
Accordingly, there can be competition on the secondary market in any event. A 
competitor requesting access to the incumbent facilities would thus not be invoking 
competition law in order to have a chance at all to enter the secondary market; 
rather, it would be trying to use competition law to enforce a specific entry strategy 
despite the existence of a range of other available strategies. Put in the balance 
against the policy considerations mentioned above – respect for property rights of 
the owner of the facilities, this would go beyond the role of competition law.
Conclusion. On the basis of Bronner and IMS Health, there would be no case for 
using competition law (Article 82 EC) to fo ce an incumbent postal operator to open





On the assumption that a dominant position has been found, the holder of that 
dominant position is typically bound by an obligation of non-discrimination, i.e. 
discriminatory treatment is likely to constitute an abuse. Non-discrimination implies 
first of all that the dominant firm treats all third parties on the same footing, i.e. by 
offering similar terms and conditions.
41 Only objectively justifiable differences in 
treatment are accepted, for instance rebates directly related to the volume of 
business. In a context of vertical integration, the Commission has taken a further 
step and claimed that “in general terms, the dominant company’s duty is to provide 
access in such a way that the goods and services offered to downstream companies 
are available on terms no less favourable than those given to other parties, including 
its own corresponding downstream operations”.
42 To this day, the ECJ has not 
expressly endorsed the Commission’s view. This latter extension of the non-
discrimination principle is difficult to apply, and in any event it should not be used as 
a backdoor to impose access obligations which cannot be imposed under cases such 
as Bronner and IMS Health, as discussed above.   
 
An interesting feature of the postal sector in this respect is that part of the work 
involved in providing a postal service can also be done by the sender itself. Typically, 
large clients can carry out some of the sorting operations themselves when 
producing the mail items and then deliver the mail to the incumbent at some further 
point down the processing and transport chain. In return for doing part of the work, 
these clients obtain various rebates. The obligation not to discriminate under Article 
82 EC implies that, in an open sector, the rebates and other special conditions 
 
41 See Larouche (2000) at 218-230, relying on leading case-law, including CFI, 6 October 1994, Case T-
83/91, Tetra Pak II [1994] ECR II-755, confirmed by the ECJ, 14 November 1996, Case C-333/94 P, 
Tetra Pak II [1996] ECR I-5951. 
42 Commission Notice on access agreements in the telecommunications sector [1998] OJ C 265/2, para. 
86. Here the main examples are to be found in telecommunications decisions. 
  24available to large clients should be available to competitors as well when they 




3.4  The Implications for Regulation 
 
In a fully open postal sector, regulation cannot rely on a technical basis any longer; 
rather it must be firmly grounded in economic analysis, as set out earlier. 
Competition law then becomes a benchmark for sector-specific regulation: in this 
respect, the conceptual and analytical principles of the new regulatory framework for 
electronic communications are very relevant.
44 Sector-specific regulation is designed 
against the backdrop of competition law and is meant to be aligned with competition 
law in substance. This means, among others, using economic analysis and following 
the well-known steps of market definition, market analysis and remedies.  
 
It will be recalled that competition law is always applicable. Accordingly, as long as 
regulation sustains and strengthens the thrust of competition law without increasing 
the regulatory burden inefficiently, it plays a helpful role and can be justified. 
Regulation going beyond the realm of what can be envisaged under competition law, 
however, requires a strong justification. 
 
A common failure is for lawmakers and regulators to fall into the “perfect competition 
trap” and indulge into micro-management of a sector. The temptation is strong to 
use regulation to try to pursue the idealized model of perfect competition, i.e. a 
market with a large number of firms of relatively similar and modest size. Yet the aim 
of competition law and regulation is to reach effective competition, meaning that 
competition induces the market to behave efficiently and to increase consumer 
welfare. Competition can take many forms, and what matters is not so much the 
structure of the market as the results it delivers. When a market is fully opened to 
competition, the incumbent will predictably have a high market share to start with. 
Economists have devoted considerable attention to this type of situation and have 
shown that effective competition can take hold of the market even though the 
incumbent still retains a relatively high market share.
45 The aim of any regulatory 
effort should thus be to bring about effective competition without micro-managing 
the industry. 
 
Caution is all the more warranted where, as in the postal sector, there is no obvious 
entry path which would be dictated by economies of scale, network effects or other 
constraints. In energy or fixed telecommunications, there are few entry strategies, 
and accordingly regulation can afford to make strong assumptions about entry and in 
practice accompany entrants along a certain path. Furthermore, the characteristics of 
these markets (monopolistic bottlenecks in the network or parts thereof) justify such 
a regulatory intervention. The situation is different in the postal sector. There is no 
monopolistic bottleneck, and entrants can pursue a number of different and 
                                                 
43 A point made by the Commission in BdKEP, supra, note 29 at para. 86. 
44 The new framework is made up of the following directives (i) based on Article 95 EC: Directive 
2002/19 of 7 March 2002 (Access Directive) [2002] OJ L 108/7, Directive 2002/20 of 7 March 2002 
(Authorization Directive) [2002] OJ L 108/21, Directive 2002/21, supra, note 25, Directive 2002/22, 
supra, note 26 and Directive 2002/58 of 12 July 2002 (Privacy Directive) [2002] OJ L 201/37 and (ii) 
based on Article 86 EC: Directive 2002/77 of 16 September 2002 on competition in the markets for 
electronic communications networks and services [2002] OJ L 249/21. 
45 See supra, section 2 
  25potentially successful entry strategies. Regulation should thus carefully avoid pushing 
the entrants towards a specific entry strategy by favouring one path over the others, 
as mentioned at the outset of this part. 
 
In the light of the foregoing, it would be appropriate to follow the test put forward by 
the Commission when selecting which markets could potentially be regulated, in the 
context of electronic communications. In its Recommendation on relevant markets in 
electronic communications, the Commission set out a threefold test.
46 Pursuant to 
that test, regulation only comes into question on markets: 
 
- with high and persistent barriers to entry; 
- with no prospect of effective competition behind those barriers over time; 
- where competition law alone does not suffice to address the problems. 
 
All of these conditions must be fulfilled. 
 
While there is not enough basis to speculate on how markets would be defined, in 
any event, the results of the study made in Section 2 above show that there are no 
monopolistic bottlenecks in the postal sector. Accordingly, it is unlikely that the first 
condition will be met for any market which might be defined in the postal sector. In 
other words, there would be no obvious candidate for sector-specific regulation. 
 
Even on the assumption that lawmakers and/or regulators would find that regulation 
of some form of downstream market could be envisaged, at the remedial stage some 
very important principles must also be respected. These principles are now central to 
the new framework for the regulation of electronic communications, but they are not 
new: they correspond to general principles of EC law and as such are equally 
applicable to the postal sector. They are: 
 
- adequacy: the regulatory remedy must address the problem which was 
identified; 
- proportionali y t : the regulatory remedy must be likely to remove the problem 
identified, must not restrict the freedom of firms more than is necessary to 
achieve its aims and must be in proportion to the problem in question. 
 
These principles are reflected in the structure of the Access Directive for electronic 
communications,
47 which provides a range of remedies for regulatory authorities to 
consider: transparency, non-discrimination, accounting separation, access and price 
controls. Very importantly, this range increases in intensity, and in line with the 
principles of adequacy and proportionality, authorities must first look at the lighter 
remedies and consider the heavier ones only if the lighter ones can be proven 
insufficient. In this respect, if any regulation were to be envisaged, it appears likely 
that the non-discrimination obligation already imposed under competition law – 
coupled if necessary with a transparency obligation in order to render that non-
discrimination obligation more easily enforceable – would suffice to ensure a proper 
functioning of the market. 
                                                 
46 Recommendation 2003/311 of 11 February 2003 [2003] OJ L 114/45, Rec. 9. These threefold test is 
further developed in the Explanatory Memorandum accompanying the Recommendation. 
47 Directive 2002/19, supra, note 44, Art. 9-13. 
  264. Country  Studies 
 
 
In this section, we examine the situation in a number of selected countries in order 
to add a practical dimension to the theoretical considerations of the previous 
sections. Four countries have been selected where some or all end-to-end mail flows 























Sweden All  100  None  8  8 
Netherlands Some  52  None  8  16 







For each country, we examine in turn: 
(i)  the state of opening of the market; 
(ii)  access regulation, now and prospective; 
(iii)  the state of competition on the market. 
 
 
4.1  The German Market 
 
4.1.1 Market  Opening 
                                                
 
In Germany, the right to provide postal services for correspondence weighing up to 
100 grams (and direct mail weighing up to 50 grams) and priced less than three 
times the rate of a 20 gram letter is reserved for the USP. Germany has adopted a 
licensing system, with eight types of licenses being distinguished by law, and licenses 
being given out by RegTP. The most important types of licences are: 
 
• Licence A – conveyance of letter mail items and addressed catalogues 
outside the reserved areas´ weight and price limits. 
• Licence B – conveyance of bulk direct mail weighing more than 50 grams 
and dispatched in quantities of not less than 50 items. 
 
48 The most recent EC progress report, see footnote 1, lists the following market shares of USPs in the  
letter post market share in liberalized markets in 2003: DE 96.0%, GB 99.7%, NL 95.0%, SE 93.4%. 
The data in the table are the most recent ones available, they come from a variety of sources 
mentioned in the text. 
  27• Licence D – provision of postal services, distinct from universal services, 
having special features and “higher quality”. 
49 
 
The German postal law provides for full market opening by 1 January 2008. 
 
 
4.1.2 Downstream  Access 
 
                                                
 
According to the German postal law, a postal licensee with dominant position (in 
fact, DPAG) is obliged to give competitors access to portions of its network at rates 
considered reasonable and competitive by RegTP. RegTP has adopted the principle 
that the price for access to DPAG’s network should be set at the retail price for the 
postal service at issue less the cost of services which the USP did not provide. In 
other words, a “retail-minus” system is in place. As a result, RegTP has required up 
to 18% percent discount for mail tendered at the USP’s outward sorting center and 
up to 21% percent discount for mail tendered at the USP’s inward sorting center.  
 
 
4.1.3  State of Competition on the Market
 
In the licensed area, the market share of CPOs in terms of revenues was 3.9 % in 
2003 and 5.1 % in 2004 (NRA estimate). If these numbers appear small, one should 
bear in mind that not the entire market is open to competition. In the competition 
area, that is, the area accessible for competitors, the CPOs market share in terms of 
revenues was 11.8% in 2003 and 15.1 % in 2004 (NRA estimate), with D licenses 
accounting for more than half of the letter post volume and about half of revenues.
50 
According to the WIK-report, the average price for delivery of a postal item by a D 
licensee was about € 0.49 in 2002, while PIN AG, one of the most important D 
licensees, has opined that there is no demand for still higher quality mail services at 
higher prices.  
 
PIN AG started its operations in Berlin in 1999; it operates a full-fledged local Berlin 
area network as of 2001, and has since then further expanded in the areas of Leipzig 
and Cologne. It focuses mainly, but not exclusively, on business clients and operates 
a six day a week delivery service. At the end of 2004, Axel Springer and Holzbrink 
decided to participate in the company, each with a 30% share. The aim of the 
company is now to grow to a full nationwide network, in cooperation with local 
partners. At the moment, the company employs about 800 people, revenue in 2003 
is said to be around €23.5 million, with the company being profitable since that year. 
In the local Berlin area, PIN AG is estimated to have a market share around 20%. 
 
Another player on the German market is EP Europost, a joint venture of TNT with the 
Hermes Logistik Gruppe. In cooperation with some 130 sub-contractors, EP Europost 
offers a five-day a week delivery of addressed direct mail exceeding 50 grams, 
catalogues exceeding 100 grams, letters exceeding 100 grams and international mail 
volumes. It guarantees a nationwide delivery for letters, while other products have 
coverage of around 70% of all German households.  
 
 
49 The required level of quality is not specified by law, but has been established by RegTP in the course 
of administrative proceedings and two licence notices (revised edition as of July 2004. 
50 The WIK report gives the estimated market share of CPOs in 2003 as 4 percent (by revenue) and 
3.75 percent (by volume); in 2004, RegTP only provides the share by revenue. 
  28A consolidator on the German market is Direktexpress, a company from Ulm, with 
revenue of € 31.7 million in 2004.
51 It collects and sorts mail to hand it over for 
delivery to Deutsche Post. It profits from a discount of 21% of which it claims to give 
19% to senders. As of 2005, the company has a capacity to handle 1 million letters 
per day.   
 
 
4.2  The Swedish Market 
 
4.2.1 Market  Opening 
                                                
 
The Swedish postal market was liberalised in 1993. A recent study by the Postal 
Market Committee,
52 of which the English language summary can be found on the 
web site of the National Post and Telecom Agency (PTS), describes the current 
situation on the market. We here describe some highlights from that study.  
 
 
4.2.2 Access  Regulation 
 
It should be noted that Swedish legislation in the postal sector was initially not 
adapted to support or create preconditions for competition and that PTS does not 
play a role in the general promotion of competition in the postal sector. Related to 
this, the Swedish postal regulation does not provide for mandatory downstream 
access. In line with EC law, the incumbent is under an obligation not to discriminate 
among large users and competitors. We refer to Jonsson and Selander (2005)
53 for a 
description of the strategies that the Swedish incumbent used to fight entry. 
 
 
4.2.3  State of Competition on the Market 
 
The study of the Postal Market Committee describes that Swedish postal market on 
the basis of the division letters (3269 million items in 2003), unaddressed direct 
advertising (over 3000 million items) and parcels (some 65 million items). 
Noteworthy is the fact that, in 2003, 95.8 % of all letters delivered were sent by 
businesses, hence, households were responsible for only 4.2 % of the volume. 
Perhaps an explanation for the relatively small share of households can be found in 
the price development since liberalisation. While the real price for business mail has 
declined by some 50 % since the early 1990's, the price for overnight delivery of 
single item mail has increased by 50 percent excluding VAT and by 90 percent 
including VAT over the period 1993-2003.
54 
 
In the letter market, the incumbent Posten AB, held 92.9 % of the market in 2003 
(3037 million items), CityMail held 6.6 % (216 million items), while the other 26 
active postal operators shared the remaining 0.5 % of the market. CityMail has 
increased its market share from 1.5 % in 1996. Posten AB also has some two thirds 
of the UDA sub market, as well as a similar share of the parcels market. Jonsson and 
 
51 Source: Newspaper article “Direktexpress macht Post Konkurrenz”, May 3, 2005  
52 The development of the Swedish postal market - a summary - SOU 2005:5 - January 2005 2005-02-
01 
53 Supra note 19 
54 The summary of the report does not make clear whether the latter price increase is in real or in 
nominal terms. 
  29Selander (2005) report the market shares in 2004: Posten still had 92% and CityMail 
had increased its market share to 7.5%. Noteworthy, however, is the fact that 
CityMail is estimated to have 25% of the markets in which it has chosen to be active.  
 
The study of the Postal Market Committee concludes: "liberalisation has not meant 
poorer service or quality regarding nationwide overnight delivery. However, Posten 
AB continues to have a strong and dominant position on the letter market, 
particularly regarding individual items of correspondence… A circumstance which 
may be part of the explanation to the relatively weak development of competition 
after liberalisation is that there are high barriers to establishment on the sub market 
individual deliveries, particularly that part referring to overnight nationwide delivery. 
This means that it is very expensive to build up a parallel nationwide network for 
delivery of letters.” We note that similar statements will apply in all countries. In our 
view, this need not be a point of concern and does not show a weak development of 
competition: it only concerns 5% of the market and competitors are not expected to 
copy the incumbent’s business model (5/6 days delivery a week); to the contrary, 
they will adopt innovative business models for some of which nationwide delivery 
could make sense.  
 
The committee notes that by lifting the price control on the segment single-item 
mail, competition might develop in a favourable direction. As households and small 
businesses only spend small amounts on mail, according to the commission, such a 
lifting of the price regulation may be justified.  
 
Equally important is the Postal Committee’s proposal to boost future competition by 
imposing “measures against unclear pricing and discrimination”. In essence, the 
Committee aims to further clarify and increase the requirements for non-
discrimination imposed on the incumbent, with the postal regulator having the task 
of monitoring these requirements. Consequently, the Committee believes that 
increasing transparency would be sufficient to further competition, that imposing 
access regulation is not necessary. As Jonsson and Selander write: 
 
“In the view of the regulator, this proposed addition will enhance 
competition by making the incumbent’s individual discounts and prices 
known to the public. An offer from the incumbent of extremely low prices 
to a single customer would be known to all customers and be attainable 
for other similar bulk mailings. It is the view of the regulator that the 
benefits of this transparency are likely to exceed the hardships of 
determining and cost estimating the standard single piece item, which all 
discounts should be measured against. The proposed transparency of the 
incumbent’s individual prices and discounts, together with the rules of 
non-discrimination, will support the supply side of the letter mail market 
in order to offer prices and discounts of long-term sustainability.” 
 
 
4.3  The Dutch market 
 
4.3.1 Market  Opening   
 
In the Netherlands, Directives 97/67 and 2002/39 were implemented with a view to 
opening up the market as much as possible. Accordingly, the Netherlands made use 
of the possibilities offered by those directives and left significant parts of the sector – 
  30direct mail and outgoing international mail – open to competition. It is estimated that 
at the moment some 52 % (in volume) of the Dutch market is open. 
 
The Dutch administration is currently following the evolution of postal regulation in 
the UK and Germany very closely. It is expected that the Dutch postal market will be 
completely opened as soon as the UK and Germany do the same and a level playing 
field is achieved. 
 
 
4.3.2 Access  Regulation 
 
Dutch postal regulation does not provide for mandatory downstream access. As is 
provided for in European legislation, however (and in line with EC competition law), 




4.3.3  State of Competition on the Market 
                                                
 
In 2004, approximately 5.3 billion items of addressed mail were delivered within the 
Netherlands, 17 million items per working day.
55 With 7.5 million delivery points, on 
average, each of these thus point receives 2.27 items of mail per day. The 
conveyance of letters up to 100 gram is reserved for TNT Post, however, it should be 
noted that direct mail does not fall in the reserved segment.   
 
TNT Post has two major competitors in the Netherlands. Sandd claims to be the 
number 2 on the Dutch market, it also states that it made a profit in 2004 and that it 
will make profits again in 2005. Sandd focuses on end-to-end delivery of bulk mail 
(direct mail and magazines). In 2004, it distributed 130 million items and had 
revenues of € 32 million, it expects to grow to 210 million items and to around € 50 
million in revenue in 2005. At the moment, it has 90 distribution centers and it uses 
6,500 delivery agents, it is growing to 8000 delivery agents in 2005. The company 
claims to have a market share of 5% of the liberalized market in 2004, and that it 
will grow to a market share of 8% in 2005. 
 
The second major competitor of TNT Post is Selektmail. It is a joint venture of 
Deutsche Post and Wegener, a Dutch publishing company. This company is about as 
large as Sandd. It also operates a nationwide delivery network. In 2004, it employed 
between 6,000 and 7,000 delivery agents. The company states that in 2003, 2004 
and 2005, it made (or will make) a profit, or nearly so, and that it will definitely be 
profitable in 2007. The company recently revealed that in the first quarter of 2005, it 
delivered 57 million items, and that it expects to have 8% of the liberalized market in 
2005. 
 
Consequently, on the basis of the reports of both these entrants to the Dutch 
market, it can be expected that at the moment TNT Post would have a share of 84 
% of the liberalized segment of the mail market. Three aspects are probably 
important to explain the success of entrants: 
 
55 These data are from the TNT Annual Report (2004) and include letters, direct mail and magazines.  
  31(i)  the market is relatively concentrated on the side of senders, which 
considerably facilitates entry easy (one can avoid sorting of actual mail by 
using computerized pre sorting of addresses),  
(ii) the delivery is mostly in urban areas, where economies of scale are less 
important (one replaces walking by biking, for example),  
(iii) most of the mail, and certainly of the business mail, is not time critical, 
that is to say it is not that important that the mail is delivered quickly, 
rather it is important that delivery is taking place on a specific agreed 
upon day, hence the mail is plannable. 
 
 
4.4  The United Kingdom Market 
 
4.4.1 Market  Opening 
 
At this point in time, the UK postal sector is partially open. Access to the market is 
essentially conditioned on obtaining a license, of which there are three types: 
 
a)  Bulk mail licenses: for mailings in excess of 4000 items per posting, which can 
be delivered by the operator itself, or which can be handed over to Royal Mail 
(RM); 
b)  Consolidation licenses: licenses that allow to consolidate mail, hence, to 
collect mail from a certain number of users and sort it before handing it over 
to Royal Mail for delivery; 
c)  Licenses for certain defined activities. 
 
It is estimated that around 30% (in volume) of the letter market has so far been 
opened in the UK.
56 However, we note that bulk mailers are not allowed to deliver 
mail from consolidators. Consequently, competition remains fragmented. Bulk mailers 
can compete on an end-to-end basis, but they are limited by the definition of “bulk 
mail”. Consolidators, on the other hand, are fully dependent on Royal Mail (RM), to 
which they must hand over their mail. 
 
In a recent decision, Postcomm decided to speed up the pace of market opening and 
lift all restrictions on access to the market as of 1 January 2006.
57 At that point in 
time, consolidators will, hence, be allowed to hand over mail to bulk mailers. 
 
 
4.4.2 Access  Regulation 
                                                
 
Condition 9 of Royal Mail’s licence implies that the company is required to enter, in 
good faith, into negotiations with ‘any person’ requiring access to its facilities; 
furthermore access prices must be non-discriminatory, they must be based on a 
reasonable allocation of costs, and they should take into account Royal Mail’s USO 
obligation. If negotiations fail then Postcomm, the UK regulator for the sector, can be 




56 Since 1 April 2002, Postcomm believes 30% by revenue is opened to competition.  Phase 2 opening in 
April 2005 (additional 30% by revenue) was abandoned as a trade off for full opening. page 7-8 
57 Postcomm, Giving Customers Choice: A Fully Open Postal Services Marke  - A decision document (18 
February 2005), available on Postcomm’s website. 
  32Postcomm has traditionally been convinced that network access is required for 
competition to develop and it has accordingly given a lot of attention to access 
conditions. To this day, Postcomm identifies economies of scale as one of the main 
barriers to entry on the UK postal market:  
 
“Postcomm’s analysis suggests that economies of scale barriers 
effectively rule out, in the short-to-medium term, a rival nationwide daily 
delivery network. Operators can help to overcome this barrier if they 
reduce the unit cost of delivery by adopting a strategy that focuses on 
reduced delivery services (say once per week) or within restricted 
geographical areas (such as financial districts).”
 58 
 
In other words, in Postcomm’s view, full (nationwide) market entry is not feasible, 
but it is profitable to enter certain market niches. Postcomm also notes that, because 
of scale economies, costs are minimized if entrants can access the network of RM, 
which is consistent with what is stated in Section 2. As a consequence of this, 
Postcomm has actively pursued a downstream access policy, publishing its first 
proposals in May 2003. These proposals resulted from Postcomm having been 
referred a conflict on access between UK Mail (from now UKM) and RM.  The points 
at issue between UKM and RM (with their respective positions) related to: 
 
- the point of access into RM’s network (choice between delivery offices (DO) 
and inward mail centra (IMC), or IMCs only); 
- the price (retail-minus or incremental cost); 
- the “fall to earth”, i.e. whether the mail flows from UKM should match the  
average flows of RM (no or yes). 
 
In its proposals of May 2003,
59 Postcomm concluded that RM should offer access at 
both the IMC and the DO, but with lower prices for DO access to reflect the fact that 
UKM would then have conducted more of the sorting and distribution process itself. 
It opted for an access price fixed by reference to incremental costs, plus a 
contribution to joint costs and a reasonable profit. It also allowed RM to control the 
“fall to earth” in so-called “revenue protection procedures”. Prices had to be 
geographically uniform.   
 
The Postcomm proposals were never put into effect, however, since RM and UKM 
voluntarily entered into an access agreement in January 2004.
60 That agreement was 
broadly in line with Postcomm’s proposal, except that it did not provide for any 
access at DO level, with Postcomm also expressing reservations about the impact of 
imposing surcharges for failure to match a certain geographical profile, as this would 
limit the ability to use other operators without facing surcharges (i.e. could amount 
to a de facto exclusivity clause). 
 
                                                 
58 See Postcomm, Competitive Market Review - Consultation Document (September 2004), available on 
Postcomm’s website, point 27 of the summary. Besides economies of scale, Postcomm also indicates 
that RM’s VAT exemption, its potential anti-competitive behaviour and consumer inertia can lead to 
barriers to entry. Only economies of scale are a concern here. 
59 Postcomm, Notice  of a Proposed Direction to RM on Downstream Access, by UK Mail, to RM’s Postal 
Facilities (19 May 2003), available on Postcomm’s website. 
60 This part is based on Postcomm’s document “Promoting effective competition through downstreamn 
access”, March 2004. 
  33In April 2004, RM signed a similar agreement with TNT Mail UK, and later with 
Deutsche Post as well. In October 2004, RM signed another downstream access 
agreement with a party that was not a licensed operator. As compared to the 
agreements previously signed, this agreement was based on zonal pricing,
61 hence, 
the price was not geographically uniform. After the signing of this fourth agreement, 
UKM and TNT issued a complaint with Postcomm stating that the offer of zonal 
pricing is in conflict with RM’s license conditions. At present Postcomm is 
investigating this complaint. 
 
In the end, therefore, Postcomm monitors RM’s access regime, and it prefers RM to 
adopt an access code.
62 Nevertheless, it has indicated its intent to bring RM’s access 
prices under price control and to require RM to implement accounting separation 
between “core value chain activities”. Note that since Postcomm has not firmly 
committed to a policy, there is regulatory uncertainty that may threaten the business 
models of entrants: if Postcomm would force low access prices on RM, then access-
based entry will be easier, hence, it will threaten the business model of market 
parties pursuing end-to-end competition.  
 
In its latest set of proposals, published on 1 June,
63 Postcom envisages to extend 
price regulation to the currently available access products of RM. These would be 
subjected to a retail-minus regime (i.e. the margin between the retail and access 
products would be regulated), in order to avert a perceived risk of margin squeeze. 
 
 
4.4.3  State of Competition on the Market 
 
In the words of Postcomm itself in its most recent policy document on the topic:
64 
 
“Although entry by competitors to Royal Mail has been broad in scope, it 
has not been particularly “deep” in terms of the volumes handled. The 
September 2004 proposals showed that competitors operating in the 
licensed area handled a total volume equivalent to about 0.3% of the 
regulated market in 2003/04 by revenue. The most recent data suggests 
this is increasing. During the first three quarters of 2004/5, new entrants 
carried 0.6% of the licensed market by revenue (or 0.7% by volume).” 
 
In other words, despite the regulatory attention which Postcomm is lavishing on the 
UK postal sector, the UK is lagging behind in fact. 
 
A few explanations can be put forward for this: 
 
First of all, it could be that the legal framework in the UK is such that the room left 
for competitors is limited at the moment. With full market opening on 1 January 
2006, things might therefore change. Yet a second explanation is that Postcomm is 
working at cross-purposes to newcomers. With its focus on ensuring access to RM’s 
                                                 
61 For details on the pricing scheme, see Roger Hill and Richard Robinson: “Establishing non-uniform 
access prices in the UK”, paper presented at the 13
th Conference on Postal and Delivery Economics, 
Antwerp, June 1-4, 2005. 
62 See Postcomm, Tackling Barriers to Entry in Postal Services – Final Decisions and Recommendations 
(31 March 2005), available on Postcomm’s website. 
63 Supra, note 27. 
64 Supra, note 62, para. S.12. 
  34facilities, Postcomm is sending the signal to the market that it prefers an access 
regime that enables newcomers to ride on RM’s facilities (“competition based on 
access”) as opposed to pushing newcomers to set up their own end-to-end 
operations. Newcomers are therefore shying away from the latter option. In the end, 
regulatory intervention could become self-sustaining, with Postcomm going further in 
the prescription of entry strategies. If that explanation is correct, then the situation 
will not improve as of 1 January 2006.
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65 Other reasons for the lack of entry could be (a) low RM pricing; (b) the fact that access prices were 
not known until January 2004, thus making any end to end investment uncertain; (c) political pressure 
on Postcomm to ensure that RM keeps volumes, thus favouring access. 
  355.  Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
 
In this report, we have sought to take a fresh look at postal regulation in anticipation 
of the full opening of the market. We have focussed on the regulation of 
relationships between competitors, and in particular on access regulation. We have 
chosen to start from the fundamental questions and avoid the kind of shortcuts 
which can be observed in some of the literature, whereby the outcome of regulatory 
processes in similar sectors is simply transposed over to the postal sector. 
 
The starting point must be the economics of the postal sector. On the basis of 
theoretical considerations and practical evidence, we have seen that neither 
economies of scale nor economies of scope constitute a barrier to entry. The postal 
sector is characterized by the absence of monopolistic bottlenecks. Rather, entry in 
the postal sector is scalable, and here theory and practice concur in showing that a 
number of different entry strategies are available and potentially successful. 
 
These findings have a number of consequences for the regulatory framework. Here 
as well, it is crucial to go back to the basics. The removal of the reserved sector 
changes the function of the regulatory framework completely. A more economic 
approach to regulation is desirable, with competition law serving as a model and a 
benchmark. In light of the economic conclusions of the previous paragraph, 
regulation must avoid prescribing entry strategies and thereby hampering the 
dynamism and innovative potential of the postal sector. Furthermore, it is important 
not to let universal service objectives interfere with the design of market regulation: 
they should only come in at a later stage. 
 
In an open postal sector, it is difficult to predict how competition law would apply. 
Nevertheless, it is safe to assume, in light of the economic evidence, that 
competition law (more specifically the essential facilities doctrine) does not warrant 
forcing incumbents to provide access to their facilities. On the assumption that the 
incumbent postal operators would be found to hold a dominant position, competition 
law will apply to as to put them under a non-discrimination obligation. 
 
Transposing these results in the regulatory discussion, this implies that prima facie 
there is no justification for heavy regulatory intervention. This conclusion is 
strengthened when the analytical framework used to select relevant markets in the 
electronic communications sector is applied to the postal sector: there appear to be 
no candidate markets for regulatory intervention. Should there be any intervention, 
the principles of adequacy and proportionality would also dictate that a light 
regulatory framework, centred around the non-discrimination obligation arising out of 
competition law, would be sufficient. 
 
In the end we must issue a strong recommenda ion to policymakers and regulators.
Take a considerate approach when it comes to pos al regulation: this is not just 
another sector in which regulatory outcomes can be impor ed by analogy. Rather, i  
anything can be learned from the experience in other sectors, it is that the policy 
fundamentals matter. The basic questions – is there any economic justification for 
regulation? would it no  produce more disadvantages than advan ages? – must be 
asked and answe ed first, before any course of action is taken. This report showed 
that in an open postal sector, a light regulatory touch is the right answer. 
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